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While writing this essay on the “policy 
climate” for improving the lives and
prospects of young teens, I asked random
contacts—cab drivers, people sitting next to
me on trains and planes, bored conference
colleagues, a woman on a particularly slow
and long elevator ride—what struck them
when they thought about young teens in
today’s world. Their responses without
exception expressed worry and concern;
so I asked what they thought should be
done and who should do it.
Over six months I talked in some depth to
26 different people from all walks of life.
An unscientific survey, I admit, but the con-
versations were always fascinating, always
went on longer than I expected (elevator
interview excepted), and were remarkably
consistent on five themes.
First, once they had gotten past some
early griping and statements of “not
understanding them,” it was not hard for
most to sympathize with the dilemmas of
being a young teen. No matter their age,
they could remember their own lives
during those years as full of confusion
and uncertainty. Some shook their heads
in disbelief and appreciation that they
had made it through adolescence at all.
Second, most thought that today’s youth
had it harder than they had. None wanted
to be young now. They cited the availability
of weapons and drugs, the media’s
demoralizing impact, the need for more
education to “make it,” the fast pace of
change in today’s world and how difficult
that made it to maintain “traditional val-
ues” (no matter the age, race, ethnicity,
apparent income or social class, they all
felt the erosion of values). One woman
cab driver said it succinctly: “Oh, we
were poorer, but these are the days of
mental hardship for kids.”
Third, they mostly blamed parents, the
public schools and the media for those
teens who could not meet current chal-
lenges. No matter how difficult the
challenge, they felt these basic institu-
tions had the responsibility to support
and guide youth.
Fourth, they had few specific positive
ideas on what to do. They were stumped
by how to make parents do better; mostly
stumped by how to improve the schools
(with a few saying the schools needed
more competition); and mostly stumped
by how to control the media (with a few
advocating strong censorship). But, when
pressed, they usually turned back to
parents—and beyond that, to fatalism.
As one said, “You’re talking about teens.
This is the period they make the right
choices or don’t, and there’s no way to
guarantee they’ll make the right ones.”
A few said maybe more Boys & Girls
Clubs would help. Several thought
churches should get more involved.
Fifth, they had very little to no confidence
that public policy had any solutions. Most
just shook their heads and said they could
not imagine what the public sector might
do, except improve the schools—and their
confidence in that was not high. A few said
the law needed to be clearer about the
consequences of wrong decisions.
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You might think that this uncertainty over
what to do arises because the people I
talked to do not specialize in the issue of
what to do; they are not “youth experts.”
And, no doubt, most issues benefit from
reflection and evidence. On the other
hand, this is not an arcane problem. Most
of these people are parents; all had been
youth. Many had lived through, or had
close acquaintance with, difficult young
teen lives.
The lengthy discussions I had with several
people in my random sample led me to
conclude that the reason for the confusion
is deeper and more diverse than a lack of
specialization. It has to do, I think, with
the complex, transitional and inconclusive
nature of the early teen years themselves;
with a conviction that the basic institutions
that are responsible for or influence youth
are failing; with a belief that there are no
good alternatives; and with an American
political and social culture that is instinc-
tively distrustful of public solutions to
problems of individual and family behavior.
In short, the underlying reasons for the lack
of solutions are grounded in some hard
realities that even the most specialized
knowledge does not resolve and at best
can only confront.
Since the “policy climate” for an issue as
fundamental as improving the lives and
prospects of young teens is, in a democracy,
rooted largely in the opinions and common
sense of ordinary citizens, I take the concerns
and opinions expressed by this random
group of strangers seriously. They were
without exception a thoughtful group of
people, none of whom expressed hostility to
or seemed uncaring about teens. If this sam-
ple was skewed, it was toward tolerance to
young teens. But other than that, they left
an impression similar to the one I get when
looking at polls and newspaper articles:
concerned and baffled about what to do.
This essay examines and builds on the
gleanings from my informal survey and
tries to sketch out the opportunities and
limits—the “policy climate”—that seem to
characterize America in the early years 
of the 21st century. Though the common
concern of citizens for young teens can be
seen as suggesting a receptive climate for
improved policies, their sense of frustration
at the performance of such basic institutions
as families and schools, their frustration at
not being able to intuit or articulate what
might be done to counter that frustration,
and their lack of confidence in public policy
as being capable of finding solutions do not
make for a truly receptive climate. And
even the most perfect solution, if there
were such a creature, needs to be recog-
nized and believed in, in order to be
adopted as durable policy.
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America’s View of Public Social Policy
No one would claim that American political
culture embraces public social policy as a
tool of first resort for improving social con-
ditions or solving social problems. Quite
the contrary: we generally view it as a tool
of last resort, when private solutions clearly
do not work and when the condition or
problem is serious and highly visible. The
major public social policy initiatives of the
1930s required a national depression to
gain support; those of the 1960s and 1970s
required riots.
This reluctance to use social policy is our
historical political culture, and rarely has it
been more evident than in the last decade.
In that broad sense, it is incontrovertible
that the “policy climate” is not favorable
to wide-scale public efforts to improve the
lives and conditions of adolescents.
Further, even when we do resort to public
social policy, we are not patient with it: we
want to see progress, and we want to see it
quickly. If we suspect social policy is not
solving problems—or is perhaps creating
other problems—we abandon or signifi-
cantly reduce our public initiatives. The
major initiatives of the War on Poverty, and
our policies regarding youth employment,
are recent examples.
The general reluctance to use public policy
to confront social concerns has hardened
over the past 20 years. The most vocal advo-
cates for public social policy claim this
abandonment is a national moral failure,
rooted in our country’s extreme individual-
ism and social Darwinism. There is an
undeniable but only partial truth to that
claim. For many people, including most
of those I spoke with, the bigger and
more practical reason for this hardening
is the perception that social policies are
ineffective—that they fail. This perception
is not confined to one party or political
stripe. An enthusiastic supporter of public
social policy, Democrat and former Secretary
of Labor Robert Reich did not advocate for
continuation of the relatively large several
billion dollars youth title of the Job Training
Partnership Act because, he said, the evi-
dence was clear: employment training
programs for youth do not work.
Secretary Reich’s view is perfectly reflected
in an “ordinary citizen’s” letter to the 
editor in the Sunday Philadelphia Inquirer
of May 3, 1999:
Personally I don’t think that the average
taxpaying, law-abiding citizen is numbed to
the atrocities that occur daily. I just think we
don’t know what to do about them. What’s
the answer? I have no idea.
Changing that perception is not solely a
matter of improved communication and
more ethical politics, difficult as those are
to achieve. A substantial body of evidence
supports that discouraging conclusion. It is
not entirely the work of morality and com-
munication that two major social programs
with strong survival records—Head Start
and Job Corps—both have evidence that
they work and a positive image among
political leaders and the public alike.
Critics maintain that the evidence is selective
because better programs were not evaluated;
the evaluation methods were too rigid; the
implementation periods were not long
enough; and that there are more promising
approaches to try. I think each of those
arguments has merit, but they are too
fine-tuned to overcome the widespread
perception that is now in place. It will take
counter-evidence, and a significant body of
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it, to dent the evidentiary crust that has
formed over our country’s general reluc-
tance to use public social policy in matters
of social behavior.
The “outcomes movement” that has devel-
oped among many policy-influential individ-
uals and institutions is a major effort to con-
front the perception of failure. Most public
social legislation now requires strong evalua-
tion components; many philanthropic initia-
tives do as well. This is, of course, an oppor-
tunity to create counter-evidence, but it is
also a risk: unless these new initiatives are a
substantive improvement over those previ-
ously evaluated, these future evaluations are
likely to produce more skepticism (Walker
and Grossman, 1999).
The strong performance of the American
economy these past 10 years, the relative
decline of the Pacific Rim economies and
the collapse of Soviet communism all
strengthen the notion that the public sec-
tor is not the way to solve problems: let the
private sector do it. The privatization of
many social functions and the heightened
emphasis on “civil society” to address critical
issues a la 1997’s President’s Summit on
youth issues are the outgrowths of all these
converging forces. They simply reflect the
public’s low opinion, shown in poll after
poll, of the public sector as a solution to
problems of social behavior.
I have painted a negative picture of the
overall view of public social policy, histori-
cally and currently, not because I think it
is always fair or always works out well, but
because it just is—a deep current in
American life, part of its character, with
strengths and weaknesses, not necessarily
or always mean-spirited and, more impor-
tant, not simply a short-term trend. It is an
independent force to be reckoned with as
we consider the prospects for improved
public social policy with regard to early
adolescents, one deeply intertwined with
America’s great successes as well as its
shortcomings.
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The Nature of the Issue
The general social policy climate in the
United States is, thus, difficult and resistant.
But the climate for a particular social policy
initiative can be less resistant depending on
a number of factors.
My reading of the past 30 years is that three
factors are especially important:
• The immediate moral power of the issue,
i.e., its capacity to push the “fairness”
button in American leaders and the 
broader electorate, based on recent events;
• The resolve, resources and political-
communications strategies of its key
advocates; and
• The clarity and urgency of the solution.
I do not mean by this to reduce American
politics to a rational and predictable frame-
work of rules and conditions; that would
ignore both the ambiguities and downright
contradictions inherent in any complex
array of human relationships and behavior
and would underrate what a powerful indi-
vidual on a mission can accomplish.
Nonetheless, our political behavior does
have its general characteristics and pat-
terns—a framework you can most often
count on to hold. I think the above three
factors are generally useful and reliable
components of a strategy to put a major
piece of social policy in place.
The first two factors have to do with getting
an audience for the issue, to have it consid-
ered as an exception to the country’s general
resistance to social policy. The various civil
rights campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s
are the most obvious examples. 
The third factor has to do with the formu-
lation and implementation of the solution:
is it comprehensible, compelling and intu-
itively doable? It is difficult to get sustained
and widespread support for a policy initia-
tive that does not have those features. The
solution does not have to be easy to do—
desegregating the schools and enforcing
fairness in public accommodations and in
employment have been anything but easy.
It just needs to be understandable.
The group of people I talked with are all
concerned about young teens—they all had
sympathy for the challenges teens face in
growing up. Compared with the respon-
dents to surveys like that done in 1997 by
Public Agenda, my interviewees are more
sympathetic to teens than is the voting pub-
lic at large. But along with their sympathy,
I did not sense either moral outrage or the
sense that the public at large has to do
something. Nor did they convey much
sense that unfairness is at the root of the
problem. Rather they see the problems of
young teens as being in part intrinsic to
being a young teen and in part caused by
social forces well beyond the reach of social
policies and programs. They are sorry that
the world has become so challenging and
sorry that early adolescence is such a diffi-
cult time in human life. They do not see a
way to change either.
Part of the reason for their attitude has 
to do with the fact that there is no long-
standing, sustained and powerful national
advocacy movement for young teens; the
voters are not roused, but rather sorry and
puzzled. And certainly there have been, over
the past few years, an increasing number of
articles and editorials saying that Americans
have lost their capacity to be morally out-
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raged. To whatever degree that is true, it
would combine with the lack of a powerful
advocacy movement to produce a potent
lassitude.
But part of the reason that there is no
powerful and sustained advocacy movement is
the very nature of the early teen years as
perceived by most adults and as reflected in
my interviews. Adults see adolescence as a
confusing and trying time, full of new
thinking, experimentation and hormonal
change, ups and downs in mood—hard to
characterize easily, hard to predict, hard to
explain in terms of cause and effect. The
people I talked to were not hostile to the
state of adolescence; they just did not think
that much could be done about it, unless it
is by parents or schools. In the end, to them,
adolescence is something to “get through”—
so internally driven as to be impervious to
outside influence.
Another reason it is difficult to mount and
sustain a campaign for adolescents is that
the information available about early teens
supports divergent views. On the one hand,
we hear that young teens are very dangerous
to themselves and others, are having babies
irresponsibly, are using drugs, and are per-
forming poorly in school—are, in short, a
disaster. The media coverage of prom
abortions and the recent string of school
shootings by so-called “ordinary kids” adds
to the impression that all teens are at risk
of such behavior. And, indeed, some very
respected youth advocates and experts say
precisely that: that all youth are at risk. This
would seem to be the basis for a movement
to increase the public’s receptiveness to
policy aimed at adolescents (though what
its content would be is a separate issue).
But there is an opposing point of view, which
stresses that in fact most teens are not so
different now than they were decades ago
and that things are better in some respects.
The New York Times recently carried two
major stories in a three-day period about
teenagers, one headlined “Birth Rates for
Teenagers Declined Sharply in the 1990s,”
which reported that from 1991 to 1996, for
the first time “in decades and decades,”
birth rates dropped, as did sexual activity,
while contraception increased. Both liberals
and conservatives took credit.
The other story outlined a number of adult
myths about teenagers:
• Myth No. 1: Youth are becoming more
violent and criminally dangerous.
“Wrong,” says the article, and presents
compelling evidence that adults are the real
threat and that youth violence is neither on
the rise nor happens very often.
• Myth No. 4: Drugs remain a threat to 
young people.
“Wrong,” says the article…the evidence is
that adults are the problem. Youth drug use
dropped in the 1970s and has remained low
ever since.
• Myth No. 5: Teenagers are naturally
rebellious and impulsive risk-takers.
Wrong again. The article says they largely
reflect their parents.
These differing views do not coalesce into
a powerful image on which to build public
policy. You can take a middle course and
say that we should not be reassured by
recently encouraging trends, that the early
teens are fragile years, that these are
indeed times of “mental hardship” for
teenagers, and demand a public response.
But that brings us to the third factor: clarity
of solution. What is it we are proposing to
do and to what end? And that is hard to say
without some rough consensus on what the
problem is.
The more problem oriented the goal is,
the easier it is to be clear about what to do.
And that is in fact what we have been doing
for the past 25 years: defining a problem
(teen pregnancy, drug abuse, poor school
performance) and then proposing a con-
crete program to solve it. That approach
can meet the three conditions laid out
above and often has.
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But it is precisely that approach that contin-
ues to produce such weak results. Evaluation
after evaluation has concluded that the
program it examined did not have much
enduring effect on teens’ lives. In the
summer of 1997, a conference was held in
Chicago solely to discuss three recent evalu-
ations of major public programs designed to
address one or more of the above-mentioned
adolescent problems—and the fact that
none showed any significant effectiveness.
This has led to the widely held view among
youth professionals and experts that defi-
ciency-oriented programming is the culprit
and that a more positive, youth development
approach must be devised. This approach
promotes a broader view of youth than the
problem-oriented approach might imply
and focuses on youth’s assets and potentials.
It is about successful development as
opposed to problem solution.
The difficulty with youth development 
vis-à-vis the three conditions laid out above
is that it is not clear what it means in policy
or in operation—it is hard to visualize—
and is thus hard to rally around. It also
does not strike a “fairness” chord, especially
when it is accompanied by the claim (as it
often is) that all youth are at risk. That claim
strikes many people, and influential ones at
that (remember the New York Times articles
above), as excessive. It also brings disagree-
ment: large numbers of people think youth
need more and firmer discipline, which is
not what the phrase “positive youth devel-
opment” brings to mind.
However, there is some evidence that rec-
ognizable pieces of the youth development
approach work. For example, everyone
would agree that a caring adult is a critical
element of youth development, and
Public/Private Ventures’ 1995 impact evalua-
tion of Big Brothers Big Sisters offers clear
evidence that a caring adult can be provided
in a social intervention and can have sub-
stantial impacts on first drug use and school
performance and behavior—not by focusing
on problems, but by promoting friendship
and trust between an adult and youth who
were previously strangers.
Evaluations of Boys & Girls Clubs have also
produced compelling evidence about their
effects on negative behaviors, and Girls
Incorporated and YMCAs have generated
operational evidence about their usefulness
to youth development. This evidence has
been fairly widely disseminated and has
helped sustain interest in two particular
aspects of youth development that have
been the focus of strong national advocacy
and media attention: mentoring and after-
school programming.
Mentoring has in fact been a subject of
favorable attention for almost a decade
now. The 1997 President’s Summit made it
the first of its five-part agenda and is being
promoted by Retired General Colin Powell
and his America’s Promise organization. It
has the support of a number of founda-
tions; of the brand-name Big Brothers Big
Sisters; and of an increasing number of
influential leaders in politics, business and
public agencies.
The after-school issue (what do children do
with that time?) has begun to receive more
and more attention. It is also one of Powell’s
agenda items and has been well-promoted
as a social policy topic by both the Carnegie
Corporation and the strong advocacy of
Hugh Price, president of the National Urban
League. In mid-April of 1998, Newsweek
carried the issue on its cover and detailed
it in a strong article.
So there are two specific initiatives for
younger teens that are alive and well in the
policy world. They both have the potential
to meet all three of the conditions for policy
advance that I noted above. Congress has
already approved a major after-school 
initiative in which the Mott Foundation is
participating. Two other influential founda-
tions—DeWitt Wallace-Reader’s Digest
Fund and George Soros’ Open Society
Institute—are investing millions in after-
school programming. Congress just gave
$20 million to Boys & Girls Clubs of America.
The Department of Justice has a multimil-
lion dollar mentoring initiative. A number
of cities and a number of philanthropies 
7
are mounting large initiatives to provide
these and other supports and opportunities
for young teens.
This is good news for policy advocates for
adolescents, particularly those who espouse
a youth development approach. It means
that in spite of the generally cautious cli-
mate for social policy in America, and in
spite of the ambiguous nature of adoles-
cence and the evidence about its current
condition, there are some policy actions
with enough clarity and urgency to have
made it to the arena of real policy discus-
sion. So there is a receptive climate…but
how receptive? Our judgment on that is
important, for it will shape our future
actions and strategies.
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To better understand the specific opportu-
nities and limits likely to make up the social
policy climate for early adolescent initiatives,
it is helpful to examine mentoring and
after-school programming in more depth.
Besides meeting the three conditions laid
out earlier, they have several other instruc-
tive commonalities.
The Commonalities of Mentoring and After-
School Programming
First, the two concepts are very basic. There
is nothing more basic than a young person’s
need for a caring adult, and that, I think, is
the most powerful reason for mentoring’s
continued popularity. After-school activities
are also basic; like mentoring, they are easy
to visualize and are doable. Most adults
remember doing them in their youth—
much as they remember having caring
adults–and it does strike their sense of fair-
ness that today’s youth do not have these
basic supports.
Second, they are identified with “brand
names” in which people have confidence:
Big Brothers Big Sisters is mentoring in the
public’s eye, and Boys & Girls Clubs and
Little Leagues are well known and highly
regarded for their after-school activities.
Does this mean that brand names are the
only way social policy can accomplish
mentoring and after-school activities? Not
necessarily. The brand name simply casts a
favorable light on the effectiveness of a
generic activity. But it does seem obvious
that the closer the identification the pro-
posed policies have with these brand
names, the stronger their chances of being
adopted. The problem with the claim “we
know what to do for youth, it’s only lack of
political will that prevents us from doing it”
is that clearly we too often do not know
how to do it. It is one thing to say that it is
obvious youth need caring adults; it is quite
another to say we know how to create delib-
erately through policy those caring adults.
Brand names are the Good Housekeeping
Seal of Doability.
Third, neither model is primarily or domi-
nantly associated with national public policy
or with public institutions. Mentoring has
almost no association with public policy,
and though many after-school activities are
indeed school-operated, many are not. The
very words “after school” free the phrase
from institutional capture; most of us think
as such of volunteer adults coaching athletic
leagues, or of Boys and Girls Clubs, YMCAs,
or 4-H. In an age of particularly low confi-
dence in public policy, this private association
is particularly useful.
Fourth, the strength of mentoring and
after-school programming is associated to a
considerable degree with their capacity to
reduce negative behavior. That is, as much
as mentoring and positive after-school activ-
ities are seen as elementary and basic to
growing up, their power to shape public
policy is still tied not to their potential for
promoting positive youth development but
to their potential for reducing negative
behavior. The largest amounts of public
funds at the federal level going specifically
to mentoring are located in the Department
of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice
Delinquency Prevention. The interest in
after-school programming for early adoles-
cents as a public policy initiative is firmly
tied to the widespread perception, based
on strong advocacy and communication
efforts, that those are the hours when 
a high proportion of teenage sex and
crime occurs.
Opportunities and Limits
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The Implications for Policy
So what do these four commonalities mean
for the policy climate when added to the
three conditions (fairness button, strong
advocacy and clear solution) noted earlier?
The most obvious overall implication is one
of tight limits. Barring the sort of unusual
occurrence and extraordinary leadership
that can upset all ordinary rules, I think
that the opportunities in the foreseeable
future for new and major public policy ini-
tiatives aimed at early adolescents are very
limited, especially at the national level.
I also suspect that at the national level such
unusual occurrences as the string of shoot-
ings in early 1998 and 1999 are less likely to
lead to major “developmental” initiatives
than to a mix of measures that are mostly
punitive (harsher sentences, treatment as
adults) and restrictive (restricted access to
guns, driving licenses and adult media).
The latter will be harder to implement
since adult financial interests are involved.
Tight as the restrictions are, they do not
deny any opportunity for action at the
national level: they simply define a narrow
avenue for successful strategy. That avenue
requires that we view public interest in
activities like mentoring and after-school
programming not as narrow, modest items
that are too limited and oriented to nega-
tive behavior to warrant an all-out effort,
but as good-as-they-come opportunities to
gain public support for the very basic devel-
opmental supports that all youth need. The
nonprofit and philanthropic organizations
that believe American society is shortchang-
ing its youth could have great impact if
they organized around these opportunities
to ensure that they develop roots in policy
and implementation, and that they in fact,
backed by credible evidence, reduce the
negative behaviors Americans want their
social policy to affect.
There are alternatives to getting behind
these modest and narrow opportunities
and pushing them. One is to put efforts
and resources behind leaders and strategies
aimed at changing our country’s attitudes
toward adolescents and toward the use of
public policy.
My read, much as I dislike it, is that either
one of those changes is a long shot, and
both together come close to impossibility.
There may be small victories in both
regards accomplished by exceptional indi-
viduals, but I do not believe they will form
the basis for large-scale changes in attitudes
toward teens and public policy, mostly
because American attitudes toward those
two topics have as much truth and merit 
as they do misperception and dysfunction.
They are neither mostly wrong nor 
mostly immoral.
Another alternative is to forget national
policy and concentrate on states, localities
and the private sector. This is the age of
devolution—exploit it.
This alternative is persuasive not only
because of devolution but because the local
level is where many of the adults, resources
and decisions that influence youth are
located—and where all these influences
manifest themselves concretely. In addition,
given the previous difficulty in convincing
the public that social interventions for early
adolescents are effective, issues of local
design, implementation and evaluation
require increased attention. The voting
public will most likely need some form of
concrete proof that an approach works
before it will even consider it nationally.
The local-state option has so much merit
that its greatest downside is that it will win
too much of the available energy and
resources. Pride in idiosyncrasy, accompa-
nied by the fact-insensitive local boosterism
that so marks American history, might
make for bursts of local activity and com-
munication, some of which might be very
successful. But if they do not satisfy the
three conditions noted earlier, they are
probably not good candidates for national
policy embrace.
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“So what?” you might ask. Let us focus on
spreading things that work through state
and local channels, avoiding the national
level to the maximum extent possible. This
strategy is appealing in two ways: first, there
is a substantive need for greater work in the
area of local-to-local and state-to-state 
policy communication and adaptation; and
second, it is a wonderfully resourceful reac-
tion to constrictive national opportunities.
However, we would be shortsighted to ignore
the national level. That level is, in the end,
where significant and equity-producing
resources reside. It is important to remem-
ber that devolution itself requires the distri-
bution of federal resources and that their
continued distribution as well as their
growth will ultimately depend on a 
national sense that these resources are
used effectively. The history of devolution
funding over the past three decades does
not offer any confidence that such funding
will persist solely on the grounds of its 
philosophy; it will be examined, and if
found lacking, it will be reduced or discon-
tinued. It may not be replaced by a signifi-
cant national initiative without convincing
evidence that some local initiatives are
effective.
The federal government is also the only
possible guarantor of any real equity in the
application of effective policies. A solely
local-state strategy, no matter how successful,
will finally meet the wall of unequal
resource capacity.
So what does all this amount to? Is there
any optimal strategy that would be most
likely to take advantage of the “policy cli-
mate” I have described—a climate that is
narrow at the national level, more wide
open at the state and local levels, and 
yet connected by the need for federal
resources?
The Elements of a Strategy
It would be foolhardy to assert any one
optimal strategy that can promise the great-
est policy benefit to young adolescents. But
as I think back on the people I interviewed,
the outlines of a broad strategy do emerge.
It contains five basic elements:
1. Ensure that new local and state initiatives
promote national opportunities. At first
blush, this might sound unnecessarily
limiting; what is the point of local
experimentation if it must conform 
to national constraints? The point here
is that local experimentation should
aggressively tie itself to national opportu-
nities—for it is the perceived success or
failure of those opportunities that will
have a great deal to do with national
attitudes about the usefulness of public
social policy. It will do little good over
the long run to act as if the public will
is a blank slate that can be created anew
“when the time is right.”
In fact, the public will is constantly being
created; the time is always now. The cur-
rent openness to mentoring and after-
school programming may be limited
opportunities, but they are opportunities
nonetheless. Their success or failure in
the new round of state and local initia-
tives will play a significant role in our
country’s willingness to consider other
policies that may be useful to early 
adolescents.
This is easier said than done. The desire
for innovation in local and state govern-
ment, and in the world of philanthropy,
almost amounts to a cult. That desire,
combined with the call by many youth
advocates for policies that are more
“comprehensive, integrated, holistic
and sequential,” conspire to discount
or ignore these apparently limited
opportunities.
I think this is a serious mistake. These
opportunities are not only politically
important; they are substantively capable
of creative adaptation to more complex
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ideas. They are the building blocks for
improved policies, and an improved
policy climate.
2. Use simple and clear language to explain 
initiatives. This seems obvious as a matter
of all communication, and especially so
in a policy climate that is narrow and dis-
trustful. I think of the letter to the editor
quoted earlier, where the writer said she
did not believe most people were numb
to the problems of the world—they just
did not know what to do about them.
She will need to be convinced that there
are things that can be done, in language
she can understand.
The youth field has on the whole taken
a different tack. It emphasizes the com-
plexity of the problems youth face and
how correspondingly complex the 
solutions must be. The language of
“comprehensive, integrated, holistic and
sequential” may serve as broad guide-
posts for those designing initiatives, but
it will never serve to improve the policy
climate. Unlike science and medicine,
youth policy is not an area of human
activity where jargon creates respect and
trust. The jargon barrier only creates
distance from the possibility of durable
policy and substantial resources.
We have to be able to say in ordinary lan-
guage what it is we are proposing to do.
This will conflict with the youth field’s
desire for professionalism, but clarity
must take precedence over that desire if
the goal is an improved policy climate.
I think it will also improve local imple-
mentation, which bears on the next point.
3. Produce evidence that initiatives make a dif-
ference in relation to priority issues. The
distinctions between preventive and 
reclamation, between deficiency and develop-
mental, are not without meaning, but
they are mostly debates internal to the
small world of aficionados who spend
their lives thinking about youth policy
and programs. They are largely irrelevant
to the forces and considerations that
make up the public policy climate,
which are primarily concerned with the
solution to priority issues.
Those priority issues are not hard to
name; they have to do with adolescent
crime, drugs, pregnancy, school per-
formance and preparation for employ-
ment. I think it is very unlikely that we
can create a durable and improved pol-
icy climate for early adolescent initia-
tives unless we can show that our initia-
tives effectively address those issues.
From that perspective, the debates noted
above are in a sense diverting us from
larger truths: we need more and improved
preventive policies and reclamation poli-
cies, for there will always be youth who
need each. And we need to address defi-
ciencies in ways that are effective—that
are developmentally appropriate and yet
sensitive to considerations of community
safety and order—which means that
punishment and discipline, as well as
supports and opportunities, must be
possible in our policy initiatives. All
these options are necessary for a policy
climate that is responsive to the variety
of actual human needs; each one must
have evidence that it makes a difference
relative to these priority issues if it is 
to generate and maintain significant
public support.
That evidence does not, especially for
younger adolescents, need to show that
the issue is totally resolved. Our social
quest is for resolution; our immediate
policy climate quest is for progress.
Thus, P/PV’s impact evaluation of Big
Brothers Big Sisters does not show that
a mentor in the early adolescent years
forecloses future problems in the youth’s
life. It does show that it, at a minimum,
forestalls them for 18 months. This sort
of “forestalling evidence” is not only
important for policy purposes; it will also
assist us in our implementation of “com-
prehensive, holistic, integrated and
sequential” programming. The latter,
of course, will still be composed of 
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discontinuous and discrete parts. That is
the nature of external interventions in
any human life. Credible knowledge of
their distinct contribution to achieving
progress on the priority issues is critical
to policy and practice.
4. Use and develop brand-name institutions.
The marketability of policies and ideas is
greatly enhanced if known and respected
organizations are living examples of those
policies and ideas. There are a number
of such institutions in the early adoles-
cent area: Boys & Girls Clubs and Big
Brothers Big Sisters are obvious examples.
We should ensure their soundness, their
spread in fact and in influence, and their
use as standards for all like activities.
This is a hard message to disseminate in
a social policy world with a general cul-
ture of innovation, funding sources that
pursue innovation separately, the natural
forces of local idiosyncrasy and a historical
moment that rhetorically favors the par-
ticular over the national. Nonetheless, I
think its value to creating a more open
social policy climate is critical: they are
the only trusted brand names we have
to work with. They need not be the
owners of all policy initiatives or their
operation; they should be involved,
used and strengthened to the maximum
extent possible.
5. Articulate roles for each sector (public, pri-
vate and nonprofit) and for each primary
institution that most people judge should be
responsible for a youth’s development (family,
school and church). Collaboration is a
popular word, and thus the involvement
of multiple sectors would appear to need
little emphasis. So I will not repeat the
substantive arguments that support it.
But there are several aspects to the word
“collaboration”; in my judgment the one
that is most talked about is overempha-
sized, while the most critical aspects
receive much less attention than 
they deserve.
The aspect that receives the most attention
is the process and goal of working together.
That aspect of collaboration sounds (and
is) both high-minded and difficult. It
implies ongoing process and consensus.
Issues of class, belief, culture, negotiating,
style, and so on, all are important.
To focus on the “working together” aspect
of collaboration, however, overemphasizes
its most difficult aspect, and sometimes
exacerbates it. As a rallying cry, it is sub-
stantively empty, and it tends to draw
skepticism from those with practical opera-
tional experience in any sector.
The aspect of collaboration that counters
“working together’s” orientation toward
complexity and process is “role definition.”
The concreteness of defining sectoral roles
and responsibilities not only helps ensure
that the initiative has beef; it also helps
ensure that the comparative advantages of
each sector are used and not ignored or
blurred by the goal or process of working
together. Working collaboratively can thus
mean mostly working apart, each sector
doing what it does best. That is generally
the best way for people from different sec-
tors to accomplish common goals.
The second aspect of collaboration that
deserves more attention is political—the
sense most people have (including my
interviewees) that family, school and reli-
gion are primarily responsible for the
behavior of youth. Other forces influence
youth, but those three institutions are
responsible.
The accuracy of this judgment can be
debated endlessly. The important point is
that to develop policy initiatives without
addressing the role of those primary insti-
tutions is to invite criticism from any num-
ber of seemingly incompatible political
forces. It is also to ignore what are in fact
elements critical to substantive effectiveness.
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Addressing the role of these primary insti-
tutions does not always mean defining a role;
sometimes an actual role for each primary
institution will just not be viable or sensible.
But it is important to communicate that
their importance has been acknowledged
and considered, and if no role is envisioned,
the reasoning behind that decision. This
will not satisfy all critics, but it will convince
some who otherwise would have a knee-jerk
reaction to any less-than-dominant role for
primary institutions.
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Closing Thoughts
There is no question that our political
culture does not tend toward excess when
it comes to devising social policies and
spending taxpayer money on adolescents—
especially on adolescents in poor communi-
ties. A more generous attitude, one that
tolerates the errors of excess, would no
doubt provide stability, direction and oppor-
tunity to many more young people than
currently have them.
Some will argue that changing that political
culture is the first order of business and
that it must be done directly, through advo-
cacy and communication. I too believe that
advocacy and communication are vital, but
I am skeptical that moral argument alone
will change our culture. The lack of confi-
dence in public social policy as an effective
means to solve critical issues is too powerful
for moral arguments to overcome, except
for occasional small victories. Guilt over
inaction is significantly blunted by a reason-
able disbelief in the effectiveness of action.
The critical complements to advocacy and
communication are seizing the modest and
concrete opportunities that do exist at the
national level and building on them at all
levels. To do so requires an understanding
and acceptance of limits on the social policy
climate that are not always uplifting but
that do form the pathway to building a
more positive social policy climate. Clarity,
evidence, brand names, sectoral roles, pri-
mary institutions—using these factors to
exploit national opportunities is in my
judgment the most effective way to tran-
scend the rather chilly climate that exists
for early adolescent initiatives. 
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